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ABSTRACT
The Web relies on the Domain Name System (DNS) to resolve the hostname portion of URLs into
IP addresses. This marriage-of-convenience enabled the Web's meteoric rise, but the resulting en-
tanglement is now hindering both infrastructures-the Web is overly constrained by the limitations
of DNS, and DNS is unduly burdened by the demands of the Web. There has been much com-
mentary on this sad state-of-affairs, but dissolving the ill-fated union between DNS and the Web
requires a new way to resolve Web references. To this end, this thesis describes the design and
implementation of Semantic Free Referencing (SFR), a reference resolution infrastructure based on
distributed hash tables (DHTs).
This thesis first appeared as a conference paper and then received several minor edits. The cita-
tion for the conference paper is as follows:
Michael Walfish, Hari Balakrishnan, and Scott Shenker. "Untangling the Web from
DNS." Proceedings of the USENIXIACM 1st Symposium on Networked Systems Design
and Implementation (NSDI '04), San Francisco, CA, March 2004.
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DNS's original goal was practical and limited-allow users to refer to machines with convenient
mnemonics [20, 21]-and it has performed this service admirably. However, with the advent of
the Web and the resulting commercial value of DNS names, profit has replaced pragmatism as the
dominant force shaping DNS. Legal wrangling over domain ownership is commonplace, and the
institutional framework governing the naming system (i.e., ICANN) is in disarray. Commercial
pressures arising from its role in the Web have transformed DNS into a branding mechanism, a task
for which it is ill-suited.
At a logical level, a linked, distributed system such as the Web requires a Reference Resolution
Service (RRS) to map from references (our generic name for links or pointers) to actual locations. In
the current Web, references are URLs with a hostname/pathname structure, and DNS serves as the
RRS by mapping the hostname to an IP address where the target is stored. As the Web has matured,
content replication and migration have become more important. However, the host-based nature of
URLs-which ties references to specific hosts and hard-codes a path-makes content replication
and movement hard.' Consequently, there have been many sensible calls, most notably in the URN
literature [2, 5, 9, 19, 28, 29], to move the Web away from host-based URLs.
Since the Web has imposed the burden of branding on DNS, and DNS has restricted the flexi-
bility of the Web, we believe that both systems would benefit if they were disentangled from each
other. However, dissolving this mutually unhealthy union would require a new RRS for the Web.
What should such an RRS look like? There has been extensive discussion about this topic, largely
within the URN community but among many others as well. While we don't provide a comprehen-
sive review of the commentary, the literature suggests the following two basic requirements for any
such RRS (both of which DNS-based URLs do not satisfy):
'Because DNS names hosts, not Web objects, it is easy to move and replicate hosts. But DNS requires the sophisticated
algorithms and substantial infrastructure of content distribution networks (CDNs) to achieve the same goals for individual
Web objects.
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Persistent object references: A Web reference, like any abstraction used for indirection, should
always be invariant, even when the referenced object moves or is replicated. This principle has been
central to the discussion about URNs. Reference persistence implies that references should not be
tied to particular administrative domains or entities, as they are currently in DNS. 2
Contention-free references: Reference choice should be free of ownership disputes or other
forms of legal interference. Disputes over human-readable names are inevitable [22], but the refer-
ence resolution infrastructure is a poor place to resolve those disputes. Thus, as has been observed
in the past [1, 10, 24, 291, references should be inherently human-unfriendly; in fact, we believe
the infrastructure should enforce this property. Of course, users must be able to associate meaning
to references, but the binding between human-friendly names and these opaque references should
be done outside the referencing infrastructure. Such a separation would (a) free the RRS to focus
only on technical concerns and (b) permit multiple, competing solutions to human-friendly naming,
thereby allowing the resulting tussle [3] to play out through legal and other social channels.
To these two well-accepted requirements, we add a third and less universally accepted design
goal (which is similar in spirit to the goal articulated in [33]).3
General-purpose infrastructure: The RRS should be designed to support a wide class of "link-
based" applications. The use of links, or pointers, to refer to objects or content on other machines
is not unique to the Web; links are used in a variety of distributed systems for identifying objects
and invoking remote code, for locating devices, and for other purposes when one wants to refer to
objects by name, not location. The URN literature deals with this multiplicity by having context-
specific resolvers [9]. However, since reference resolution is a hard problem that requires delicate
design, we believe it should, if possible, be solved once and well.
How does one build a general-purpose RRS for persistent and contention-free references? In
our work here we followed two key design principles:
Semantic-free namespace: We believe that the simplest way to achieve persistence and contention-
free references is to use a namespace devoid of explicit semantics: a reference should neither embed
information about the organization, administrative domain, or network provider it originated in or
in which it is currently located, nor be human-friendly. We call such references semantic-free.
Minimal RRS interface and factored functionality: A general-purpose RRS should not im-
pose unwanted semantics on applications, implying that the RRS should support a minimal interface
limited to reference resolution. Therefore, all other functions required by applications-including
2For instance, consider the Web page of someone who first created the page while at institution X but later moves
to institution Y. If the reference record is controlled by the X domain (as it is with DNS) then maintaining persistence
would require that X allow the author to update the record (if only to provide an HTTP redirect) for all time, even when
the author is no longer affiliated with X. This expectation is impractical.
3The Globe project [32, 33] shares many of the same motivations as SFR, but, as we discuss in Section 7.2, the set of
technical challenges addressed is rather different.
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mapping between human-friendly names and references-should be handled by auxiliary systems.
We believe that the RRS's job is to provide a platform that allows for competition and flexibility in
application-specific support and not to solve directly these higher-level problems.
We used these two design principles to develop both an RRS with semantic-free references
(SFR) and a version of the Web that uses only SFR. The result is a system decomposition that
differs from today's Web: whereas humans today rely on being able to read, and occasionally type,
references (URLs), the Web-over-SFR handles user-level naming outside the reference resolution
service by enabling a competitive market for canonicalization services that map human readable
names to semantic-free tags. In the Web-over-SFR, search engines function as they do today, except
they return links backed by semantic-free tags rather than by DNS-based URLs. Web browsers in
turn use the SFR infrastructure to resolve these semantic-free tags to meta-data like IP addresses,
ports, and pathnames that identify Web objects.
In addition to a different factoring, SFR enables new functionality for the Web, including:
object-based migration wherein objects can move without requiring referring links to be updated or
broken; flexible object replication wherein individual objects can be replicated without heavyweight
machinery, administrative control over the hosts of the replicas, or hard-coding the administrative
entity responsible for the meta-data; and content location services wherein individuals can provide
reliable pointers to objects they did not contribute.
SFR is a "clean-sheet" design; not only does our design, in its pure form, require changes to all
Web browsers, it also requires an infrastructure that currently does not exist. The Web-over-SFR
is incrementally deployable via Web proxies, and a transition strategy exists, but we will not dwell
on these methods. Our goal is rather to investigate, without regard to deployment issues, how one
might best support the Web and other applications that require reference resolution. We hope that
the lessons learned in this exercise will be useful, indirectly if not directly, in any future evolution




SFR's advantages do not come without cost. Many of the desirable features of today's Web derive
from DNS. As examples, DNS's hierarchical structure enforces URLs' uniqueness and provides
fate sharing (a disconnected institution can still access local pages) while the human readability of
DNS hostnames gives users some (perhaps misguided) confidence they have reached their desired
data. Since SFR has abandoned both hierarchical structure and human readability, the SFR design
must explicitly provide for the properties we have mentioned and others like them. Some of these
challenges must be met by SFR itself, and some should be left to auxiliary systems supporting the
Web-over-SFR. Addressing these challenges is the main focus of this paper. We now briefly discuss
them and defer solutions to Sections 3 and 4.
2.1 SFR INFRASTRUCTURE CHALLENGES
Scalable resolution. Until recently, there was no way to scalably resolve references in a semantic-
free namespace, which is largely why the URN literature chooses a partitioned set of resolvers [9].
However, the recently developed DHT technology [15] is designed to do exactly this: at their core,
DHTs map an unstructured key from a flat namespace to a network location responsible for the
key. But typical DHTs require O(log n) hops per lookup in an n-node system and would introduce
intolerable latency. Thus, SFR must provide, on average, significantly faster lookups than the usual
DHT performance bound.
Security and integrity. Any RRS must secure content providers' meta-data and enforce refer-
ence integrity by preventing two logically distinct objects from receiving the same reference. DNS
guarantees these properties by relying on the administrator of each delegated namespace to protect
meta-data and avoid local conflicts. A semantic-free namespace, however, has no natural admin-
istrative partitioning and thus protecting references-even under network partitions and malicious
clients-is non-trivial.
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Fate sharing. By delegating its namespace, DNS naturally offers fate sharing: if a domain
(e.g., f oo.edu) becomes disconnected from the rest of the Internet, users in that domain can usually
still access content served by that domain (e.g., content at x.f oo.edu), since the authoritative name
server (e.g., for foo.edu) is typically on their side of the partition. Since semantic-free names do
not reflect objects' origin, SFR must be explicitly structured to provide fate sharing.'
Trust and financing. DNS has a very simple financing and trust model: organizations provide
the authoritative server for their own domain, and DNS nodes need only serve requests for hosts or
from users within the domain. Moreover, DNS requires only a small common infrastructure-the
root servers-so all other expenses are incurred by the organization reaping the benefit (by allowing
others to access their hosts). References in SFR are not tied to the content provider, so the "serve
your own" trust and financing model does not apply.
2.2 WEB-OVER-SFR CHALLENGES
When the Web (or other applications with human interaction) runs over SFR, two important chal-
lenges arise: how users will find objects and how users can be sure that the content they see corre-
sponds to the object they are seeking. Rather than seek a single all-encompassing solution to these
problems, we instead factor our system so that multiple, competing solutions can arise.
Canonical names. There is good reason for the contention over DNS domains; they allow
URLs to serve as canonical names that are memorable, human-readable, and easily transcribed. In
contrast, the SFR approach provides opaque bit strings with none of these useful features. There
is great benefit in simple and recognizable URLs, such as http://www.cnn.com. Thus, similar
sets of canonical names that users can remember, understand, and transcribe must exist in the SFR
framework.
Confidence. Humans browsing the Web are usually confident that URLs beginning with
www.nytimes.com identify content published by The New York Times newspaper. While this reliance
on the human semantics of a URL is hardly foolproof (as recent scams [4] have demonstrated), it
does represent an important user need. SFR must clearly provide an alternative mechanism for giv-
ing users confidence in the content they are viewing.
'We must address fate sharing because we insist on semantic-free references not because we use DHTs. The SkipNet
DHT [12] provides fate sharing, but it encodes administrative domains into references.
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3SFR DESIGN
Our proposed SFR system is a shared infrastructure that provides a single service: mapping from
a semantic-free tag that references an object to meta-data associated with the object. Content
providers insert an object's meta-data into the infrastructure and associate it with a tag. Consumers
of the content submit these tags to the infrastructure and receive object meta-data in response. In
this section, we focus on this single service and not on auxiliary questions, like how human-friendly
names are mapped to tags.
3.1 ESSENTIALS
SFR uses a distributed hash table (DHT) to map semantic-free 160-bit strings, SFRTags, to o-re cords
("object records"). The o-record, shown in Figure 3.1, contains an object's location and other
meta-data. The SFR infrastructure does not store objects, only their o-records. Our implementa-
tion uses Chord [31] as the underlying DHT routing protocol and DHash [8] to store the o-records,
but the SFR architecture is modular and permits another DHT protocol to be substituted. In fact,
SFR could use any system that supports scalable lookups on unstructured identifiers (such as the
location service in the Globe system [32, 33]). For convenience, we will refer to DHTs as the
fundamental resolving technology.
The location field is set by the application inserting the o-record and holds one or more
values describing the location of the data corresponding to the SFRTag. Each location field entry
SFRTag: Oxfl2l2Q99abcab678ac345ba4d...
location: (ip, port), (DNS name, port),
SFR Tag
oinfo: App-specific meta-data
ttl: time-to-live: a caching hint
Figure 3.1: The o-record
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is either an IP address and transport port pair, a domain name and transport port pair, or another
SFRTag (that in turn resolves to another o-record). These latter two options permit additional
degrees of indirection so that if many objects migrate together, they can all be updated by a single
change to, respectively, DNS or SFR (the SFR option allows objects to move to different hostnames,
while the DNS option enables changes to IP addresses for a fixed hostname). SFR's use of DNS
to abstract the location of a host is not a contradiction; as we noted before, DNS is designed for
exactly this function.
The resolving infrastructure imposes almost no constraints on applications since the structure,
length, and content of the oinf o field are application-defined; e.g., for the Web application, the
field could hold the type of transport protocol (HTTP, FTP, HTTPS), a pathname on the server, etc.
The SFR infrastructure does not look at this field. Finally, like DNS's TTL, the ttl field in the
o-record is a caching hint instructing entities outside the infrastructure about how long to cache
a given o-record. Because SFRTags are persistent references, the copy of the o-record in the
infrastructure never expires and so SFRTags cannot be reassigned. As a result, if a content provider
wishes to retire an o-record because the reference is no longer valid, the content provider empties
the o-record.
The trust and economic model we envision for SFR is quite different from that of DNS because
one cannot "serve your own" when the tags are semantic-free. So, instead of a DNS-like infrastruc-
ture comprised of "donated" machines dedicated to specific domains, we envision a more uniform
infrastructure in which SFR nodes are trusted to serve all o-records. While there may be a startup
period during which an "angel" (e.g., NSF, European Union) funds the initial infrastructure (which
may require, say, only 1,000 machines), once SFR becomes accepted as a viable service there could
be competing commercial offerings. We believe that eventually several competing SFRs could peer
with each other (exchanging updates) much like today's tier-1 ISPs, each holding mirror copies of
all data. These peered SFRs would together form the global SFR infrastructure.
These SFR structures would be managed infrastructures with good connectivity (we repeat:
even though we are using DHTs, which are a so-called P2P technology, we are not relying on
flaky personal machines connected via cable modems!), so the SFR infrastructure machines would
be relatively stablel and bandwidth between them relatively plentiful. Obviously the issue of the
economics of such infrastructures is an open question, and our design thus relies on the shaky
premise that competitive SFR infrastructures would arise; however, here we hope to convince the
reader only that such infrastructures would indeed offer a better solution to the problems in today's
Web and other linked services.
Before describing the rest of SFR's design, we emphasize that SFR's challenges derive from its
semantic-free namespace, and it is this characteristic, rather than the particular choice of resolving
substrate, that identifies SFR. One way to implement SFR may in fact be to use semantic-free DNS
names. Indeed, one transition strategy is deploying various nameservers for a .sf r domain that
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Figure 3.2: SFR components.
would look up references in an SFR infrastructure. We do not view this as a contradiction: our
objective is not to eliminate DNS but to change the way the Web uses DNS to resolve references.
A system of semantic-free names built on DNS would face the same challenges as SFR and would
require similar machinery, such as a way to do scalable resolution in an unpartitioned namespace.
3.2 SFR COMPONENTS
Figure 3.2 shows the components of the SFR system. At the core is the SFR infrastructure, a
collection of managed nodes (of the kind we described above) that run SFR server software. This
software runs on top of a DHT protocol and storage manager implemented at each node.
Applications store and retrieve o-records corresponding to SFRTags using the SFR client li-
brary. The client interacts with the SFR infrastructure using an SFR relay, a software module that
intermediates between client requests for storing and retrieving o-records and the SFR infras-
tructure. The relay handles o-record caching and also ensures that clients can gain access to the
o-records for content hosted by the local organization even when the organization is disconnected
from the SFR infrastructure. The relay itself does not need to implement the DHT routing protocol
or the storage manager; it connects to the SFR infrastructure at an SFR portal, which is simply a
node in the infrastructure.
If SFR becomes widely deployed, client machines will need to discover a reachable SFR portal
or relay. Clients today find out about available DNS servers via DHCP or via hard-coding; we
envision identical techniques for SFR. Providing access to an SFR portal or relay would be one of
the services offered by an ISP or large institution.
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3.3 SECURITY AND INTEGRITY
We now describe (a) how content providers who are clients of SFR may create unique, contention-
free references without administrative namespace delegation and (b) how the infrastructure secures
the content providers' meta-data. SFRTags and their associated o-records have these properties:
" The infrastructure ensures that SFRTags are the output of a hash function and thus have no human
meaning.
" Content providers can create unique references without consulting a naming authority or any
other entity.
" Only an o-record's creator, or someone who shares his private key, can update that o-record.
" Given a reference, the o-record is self-certifying.
" Content providers can update their public keys without invalidating references.
" The namespace is too massive for anyone to monopolize a significant chunk of it.
To achieve these properties, the SFR infrastructure first requires that an SFRTag is a secure,
collision-resistant hash of the content provider's public key and an arbitrary salt. So when a content
provider wishes to create or update a reference, it sends to its SFR portal (perhaps via an SFR
relay), a request with all of the following elements:
" o-record, and SFRTag = hash(public key, salt);
" public key, salt, and version;
" signature (o-record, salt, version);
Before accepting this request, the responsible SFR infrastructure node checks that the SFRTag
is the correct hash and that the signature is valid. The SFR infrastructure node then stores all of
the data listed above. If the SFRTag was already in the infrastructure, the responsible node further
checks that the request is signed with the current private key. (For clients who do not use public
keys-and thus receive no protection-the SFR infrastructure also accepts references that are the
hash of a client-chosen salt, only.) Because each reference is the output of a hash function, it is
highly unlikely to have mnemonic or branding value, which in turn removes the need for a naming
authority or other arbiter. In addition, SFR does not require, or use, a public key infrastructure.
On a lookup, a content consumer sends a request for the SFRTag to its SFR portal (perhaps via
an SFR relay). If the tag is in the infrastructure, the responsible DHT node returns the corresponding
o-record along with the auxiliary data mentioned above. Returning this data makes the o-record
self-certifying [18]: i.e., without resorting to a public key infrastructure, a retrieving client will be
able to tell if a compromised node or malefactor in the middle of the network alters any of the
data (since the reference is bound to the public key, and the signature binds the public key to the
data). Moreover, SFR clients ensure that they are hearing from bona fide SFR infrastructure nodes
by verifying the signatures on messages sent to them from the infrastructure nodes. We presume
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that when a client receives the address of an SFR node (e.g., by DHCP, as with DNS servers), the
notification also includes that SFR node's public key.
Public key updates do not invalidate the reference since the SFR infrastructure requires only that
the relationship between the SFRTag and the public key is satisfied when the tag is first inserted.
After that, the SFR infrastructure ensures that updates to the public key or to the content have been
signed with the existing private key. To maintain the self-certifying property, the infrastructure must
store the content provider's signed request to update its public key and must also return these signed
requests in response to lookups.2' To guard against replay attacks, SFR adopts DHash's approach
[8]: SFR clients increment, and sign, a version number each time they update their o-record, and
the infrastructure accepts updates only with increasing version numbers.4
The sheer size of the SFR namespace prevents anyone from monopolizing a significant por-
tion. Protecting individual SFR nodes or the DHT as a whole against loading is a different matter,
however. Our intent is that these attacks will be addressed by management tools to prevent content
providers (where a content provider is defined by its public key) from using too many resources.
3.4 LATENCY
SFR uses three kinds of TTL-based caching to reduce latency and balance load among the infras-
tructure nodes. First, each relay caches o-records (and the auxiliary data like public keys and
signatures), sharing that cache among the clients that use that relay. Because the use of a relay is
optional, SFR clients also cache o-records.
Second, each DHT node in the infrastructure keeps a location cache of identifier-to-IP mappings
for nodes it has recently heard about. This reduces the number of hops in certain DHT routing
schemes that require O(log n) hops in an n-node system. In Section 6 we present simulation results
showing that location caching can lower the number of hops to two or three in over 99% of lookups.
"One-hop" DHT routing schemes [11] are another way to lower the number of hops.
Third, SFR infrastructure nodes also cache o-records, which helps balance load and ease hot-
spots corresponding to highly popular o-records: such o-records will quickly be cached by the
portals and so should not stress the infrastructure. In addition to each portal's caching the o-record
retrieved on behalf of a relay or client, our design also permits nodes on the DHT lookup path to
cache o-records, thereby proactively populating their cache. 5
2 We are indebted to Bryan Ford for this suggestion.
3Without additional infrastructure, the loss of a key could be catastrophic, but one could imagine auxiliary services
that would serve as trusted and secure repositories of such keys. However, if a key is compromised, the situation is more
dire; we think the only way the original owner can prevent the takeover of his content is to break all current tags (i.e.,
render them unusable by anyone, adversary and victim alike).
4While we don't discuss replication explicitly here, DHTs need replication to provide reliability. Thus, retrieving
clients may need to download from several locations to ensure they have the latest version number.
5In general, improving the performance of DHT-based systems is an active area of research, and we expect to use
solutions from ongoing work in the community on data replication, load balance, denial-of-service defense, fault toler-
ance, and protection against compromised nodes. While solutions to these problems are not all currently at hand, we
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3.5 FATE SHARING AND SCOPING
In the following, we define an "organization" as a set of machines behind an access link. If an
organization corresponds to a single DNS domain, and if the organization's DNS servers are also
behind the access link, then, when the link fails, hosts in the organization can continue to reach
data within the organization. As described so far, SFR does not provide such organizational fate
sharing because an organization's o-records are not explicitly associated with, or stored within,
the organization.
However, SFR can ensure that clients in the same organization as the creator of an object can
access the object when an access link fails, thereby replacing domain-based fate sharing with what
we call write-locality-based fate sharing. The enabling mechanism is a shared org-store holding
copies of the o-re cords created or modified within the organization. Each time a new o-record
is created or modified via one of the relay nodes in the organization, the relay stores a copy in the
org-store and arranges for it to be stored in the SFR infrastructure.
When retrieving, the relay first checks its internal o-record cache. If the o-record is in the
local cache and the TTL is still valid, the relay returns the o-record to the client. Otherwise,
the relay contacts its portal to initiate a lookup of the SFRTag in the SFR infrastructure. At the
same time, the relay contacts the org-store, which returns the o-record corresponding to the tag
if one exists, disregarding any TTL value set in the o-record. If the relay does not hear from the
SFR infrastructure, it times out and infers that it cannot access any of the persistent copies in the
infrastructure. It returns to the client the o-record returned by the org-store.
The reason the relay does not directly send the version from the org-store before waiting for a
response from the SFR infrastructure is that another content provider, that shares the same private
key but is located in another organization, may have updated the o-record. For this reason, when-
ever the relay retrieves an o-record from the infrastructure, it also sends a copy to the org-store
so that the versions in the org-store and the infrastructure can be reconciled if necessary. The ver-
sion number in the o-record, incremented on each update, and a UTC timestamp set by the writer
indicating the last update time, facilitate this reconciliation.
Updating an o-record via a relay within the organization also requires the update to be sent
both to the infrastructure and to the org-store. If the relay finds that the infrastructure store request
does not succeed because of lack of connectivity, it asks the org-store to reconcile the SFRTag
whenever the organization is reconnected. Updating an o-record that was originally created in a
different organization does not immediately update the org-store in the creating organization; that
update happens when the SFRTag is looked up via a relay in the original organization. This level of
inconsistency is unavoidable without out-of-band synchronization.
The foregoing scheme improves availability for disconnected organizations but does not en-
are optimistic that there is no fundamental obstacle to basing SFR on DHTs, and so we focus on the many SFR-specific
problems.
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sure that infrastructure nodes hold up-to-date versions of o-records. If an organization remains
internally connected, the semantics of this write-locality-based cache are:
" For o-records created in an organization and never updated from outside the organization,
clients within the organization always get the most recent version.
" For o-re cords updated by more than one organization, a client within the currently disconnected
organization may receive an older version that is no older, and is possibly newer, than the last
version written from within the organization.
" When connectivity between the SFR infrastructure and an organization is restored, (1) all sub-
sequent retrievals from within the organization return the o-record with the highest version
number, and (2) all subsequent retrievals from outside the organization return the latest version
after it has been reconciled.
" Reconciliation of o-records uses either the later timestamp (which works reasonably well as-
suming loose clock synchronization between writers and preserves the same semantics as when
multiple writers update an o-record while connected to the SFR infrastructure), or an out-of-
band mechanism (e.g., by discarding one of them, perhaps with human involvement). We believe
this approach is reasonable because conflicting updates are likely to be rare and suggest the ab-
sence of higher-level human coordination.
" Unlike with DNS, clients in different organizations on the same side of a network partition are
not guaranteed to be able to access the other organization's meta-data.
Scoping arises naturally in the org-store framework: if clients within the organization wish to limit




In today's Web, references (i.e., URLs) encode the administrative entity (i.e., the domain) responsi-
ble for an object's meta-data. Thus, if an object changes domains, hyperlinks to the object are al-
most guaranteed to break, and a human browsing the Web might get a "notify the referrer" message.
Since references should not have to change when objects move, we attempt, in the Web-over-SFR,
to provide a set of references that cleanly permit object migration and replication.
As we have already noted, the current Web supports object migration only if the original domain
(which may no longer have any connection with the content creator) issues HTTP redirects for
objects it no longer hosts. In the Web-over-SFR, in contrast, all of the information about how to
reach a particular Web object-the IP address and port of the Web server and the pathname on
the Web server-is abstracted by the SFRTag. Content creators (e.g., individuals, organizations,
research groups) insert this reachability information into an o-record and store the o-record
in the SFR infrastructure. To take advantage of these persistent references, Web authors embed
hyperlinks like:
sfr://f 012120.../optional.path
where f012120... is an SFRTag resolving to a set of tuples identifying the object, as shown in
Figure 4.1.
To retrieve objects using this kind of URL, the Web browser uses the SFR client to fetch the
meta-data and construct an HTTP request. The path in the HTTP request is the concatenation of a
SFRTag: Oxf01212099abcd3848123ab38121
(ip-addrl, porti, protol, pathi),
(DNS name, port2, proto2, path2),
Figure 4.1: Logical view of the o-record for the Web-over-SFR. The proto field specifies the
access protocol (e.g., HTTP, HTTPS, FTP). The path field is the local pathname on the server and
identifies the referenced object to the server.
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path from the oinf o field with the optional-path from the original URL. This design preserves
HTTP's semantics. The SFR infrastructure is invisible to Web servers, which continue to receive
HTTP GET requests with server-specific paths. The optional-path permits flexibility, as we
describe below, and it also permits dynamic content because embedded links can have paths with
application-specific semantics. Without the optional-path, content providers, Web clients, and
Web servers would need to involve the SFR infrastructure to construct unique URLs. That these
SFR-based URLs contain semantics illustrates that SFR allows applications to define their own
semantics while still using a semantic-free referencing infrastructure. 1
4.1 BENEFITS OF WEB-OVER-SFR
Resilient linking. The SFR approach permits a general migration solution: if a piece of content,
currently referenced by an SFRTag, moves to another Web server at a different path, the content
provider need only change the location and oinfo fields in the o-record in order to permit the
correct reference resolution to occur for Web clients. Web pages linking to the object continue to
maintain the same references.
This approach is flexible about how much the reference functions as an abstraction. An SFRTag
can refer to a machine (so the optional-path is the same as it is with today's URLs), to a file (so
the SFRTag abstracts the entire URL and the optional..path is empty), or to a directory structure
(so the SFRTag abstracts the entire URL up until the root of the directory, and the optional-path
is everything underneath the directory). For example, a researcher might have a large collection of
publications in one directory and wish to abstract only the collection's location. In this case, the
SFRTag would abstract the IP address or domain name of the Web server as well as the path on
the server up until the document collection. The publications would be differentiated by their file
names. So the SFR URLs could be:
sfr://f bcd123/publ.ps
sfr://f bcdl23/pub2.ps
If the researcher's affiliation then changes, he or she alters the o-record corresponding to
fbcdl23 and inserts the new Web server and new path on the server. A referring Web page embed-
ding sfr://f bcd123/publ.ps can safely be ignorant of the move.
If a particular object separates from a directory that had been abstracted by an SFRTag, then,
under the design as so far explained, existing references would break. Our solution for this case adds
a level of indirection: the content owner would update the o-re cord to point to a new location that
would maintain a map of old pathnames to new location/pathname values. Although this solution
can implement HTTP redirection (if the new location were the same as the old server location),
'Note that DNS could certainly be enhanced with a record type that abstracted individual Web objects, instead of
hosts, but as we explain in Section 7.2, such a system would either inherit the problems we have identified with today's
use of DNS or else look very much like SFR.
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our solution does not mandate this approach. In Section 7.1, we discuss a more elegant, but more
demanding, solution that does not-require this level of indirection.
The main reason the solution we have described above is more powerful than today's DNS-
based RRS for achieving resilient linking is that, unlike DNS, SFR is able to resolve both the tag
and the pathname before any HTTP messages are sent to the Web server. Achieving similar behavior
today would either require a prescient content provider to have a domain name for each potentially
movable piece of content beforehand, or rely on HTTP redirection; the former is impractical and a
management challenge, whereas the latter is hard to ensure when one moves between organizations.
Flexible object replication. SFR provides a natural solution for replicating Web objects: in
response to a request for an SFRTag, the infrastructure can return a number of different logical lo-
cations and paths. This property might seem inconsequential, but consider how hard it would be
under the current Web to replicate a given object in two places without creating mirror machines
containing exactly the same content. To do so would require (a) creating separate DNS names for
each object being replicated, (b) using virtual hosting so that the two Web servers were config-
ured to recognize each per-object DNS name and (c) configuring DNS entries to refer to both Web
servers. Using a domain like ww.personalname.org would not work since that forces all objects
in the domain to be resolved by the same administrative entity forever, making it impossible, e.g.,
for an individual object like www.personalname.org/photos to migrate later without breaking ex-
isting, referring hyperlinks. The Web-over-SFR solution is much simpler and would allow several
collaborators to replicate each other's content quite easily, yielding a grass-roots replication service.
In the case of massive replication, namely when it would be absurd or inappropriate to return
to the client all of the locations of all replicas, we expect that the SFR infrastructure would direct
clients to external services, such as a replication server that would direct requests to the appropriate
replica using information from the requester's IP address and other hints. We discuss alternatives to
this decision in Section 7.1.
Reliable pointer services. Because SFR permits anyone to insert o-records into the infras-
tructure, third parties can become known as good indirectors-they can create and expose SFRTags
that always resolve to particular sites or objects, and it would be their responsibility to track the
object's movements. Referring Web pages could embed the SFRTags established by the indirectors,
and then these providers of reliable pointers might have an incentive to make the location service
work. For example, a service might provide a pointer to "This year's tax forms"; no matter what
year it is, you can access the necessary tax forms by following the SFRTag.
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4.2 HUMAN-USABILITY CHALLENGES
The challenges that arise under the SFR framework but which are not explicitly solved by the in-
frastructure are related to user-level names, our term for the ways that humans identify content, such
as search queries, typed-in URLs, AOL keywords, hyperlinks in documents, saved bookmarks, and
URLs sent in e-mail. DNS-based Web URLs conflate the reference, a low-level tag resolved by
the RRS, and the user-level name, which allows people to find what they are looking for. SFR, in
contrast, separates the two functions, focusing on reference resolution and exposing an interface
that permits many user-level naming solutions to co-exist.
Canonical names. A natural question is how humans will retrieve content if references are
human-unfriendly. The answer is, first, that humans mostly do not depend on typed-in URLs today.
All other current user-level naming methods work perfectly under SFR: search queries, for example,
return candidate SFR URLs instead of DNS-based URLs. Individuals could also e-mail SFR URLs
to each other. (Users are already used to dealing with human-unfriendly URLs this way: links
sent in e-mail from amazon.com, for example, are essentially a domain name plus a semantic-free
string.)
Second, when users do type URLs, they use DNS as a canonicalization service: a well-known
mapping from human-readable names to Web objects. To permit equivalent functionality under
SFR, DNS need not be the canonicalization source. Moreover, it might be desirable if several
mapping services existed. We believe that if SFR becomes popular then Web service providers with
appropriate expertise would compete to provide such services. Two obvious models already exist-
AOL keywords and the paper yellow pages-and we can imagine a wide spectrum of services that
map user-level names to a particular SFRTag or set of SFRTags.
We observe that to the extent DNS provides canonical handles today, it does so mainly for Web
sites and seldom for individual Web objects. Since references in SFR can be as coarse as per-site
or as granular as per-object, any canonicalization service for SFR would naturally be able to name
entire sites and individual objects, ultimately yielding a more complete canonicalization function
than DNS.
Of course, under SFR, the problem of bootstrapping exists, namely how users get pointers to
directory services. A number of possibilities exist, including pointers shipped with browsers, links
sent in e-mail from friends, applications on the local host that populate a local database of useful
sites, and network administrators or ISPs dynamically providing pointers to useful canonicaliza-
tion services with DHCP. DNS names themselves could provide one canonicalization service, e.g.,
www.f oo.com would map to an SFRTag for the home page for Foo, Inc. This is similar to the scheme
presented by Ballintijn et al. [2]. Using DNS in this way is not a contradiction: we are not using
DNS for referencing but rather as a user-level naming service that competes with any number of
other such services.
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Confidence. Although human users of the Web usually have confidence in Web content because
of the associated DNS name, we note that this level of confidence is actually quite weak. It depends
entirely on whether the "correct" company owns a given domain name, and it is easy to create
spoof sites that give users misplaced confidence in content. Nevertheless, domain names convey
meaning and help users validate URLs before visiting them (e.g., when selecting among search
results). Hence, we anticipate that search engines (and others) would hide SFR URLs and give
humans confidence in new ways.
Rather than give lengthy detail on ways humans can have well-placed confidence in content
under SFR, we outline just one (though imagining others is not hard): hyperlinks on Web pages
optionally embed a taginf o object alongside the SFRTag. This object contains cryptographic
statements of the form "Entity E says that this tag is CNN", where E is a Web service provider that
users trust. Users' browsers would inform them about who is certifying the link. We note that this
scheme is implemented entirely above the SFR layer and that it is an application function, leaving
SFR performing only reference resolution. With such a scheme, content authentication could be
granular-it could occur at the level of individual objects, rather than at the level of administrative
domains (as certificates issued by certificate authorities do today, for example).
Rather than "hard-coding" one approach to canonicalization and confidence, we believe the
infrastructure itself should permit multiple schemes to co-exist. Separating the functions of user-
level naming and reference resolution will certainly not solve the intractable problem of humans
fighting over names. But it will move these tussles [3] to an arena in which multiple services can
compete but in which none of these competing services is part of the core reference resolution
infrastructure.
4.3 PRAGMATICS
So far we have focused on the fundamental problems faced by SFR. However, there are more prag-
matic concerns that would have to be addressed before the Web-over-SFR could be viable. We don't
believe they represent insurmountable difficulties, but they will require new tools. We now mention
a few of these issues.
Local references. Currently, with DNS-based URLs, if a hyperlink in a Web page points to an-
other page in the same administrative domain, there are two possibilities: either the hyperlink will be
local (e.g., <A HREF=/imgs/dog.gif>) or the hyperlink will reference the current domain (e.g.,
<A HREF=http://mysite.org/imgs/dog.gif>). The first case does not involve any lookups,
so it would continue to work in an SFR-based Web (although, because references can abstract any
portion of the path component, only absolute links will work, not relative ones). In the second case,
under DNS, the client need not do another lookup because it would have the address information
for mysite.org cached.
27
Under SFR, however, if the content provider used another SFRTag to refer somewhere on the
same site (e.g., <A HREF=sf r://ab12126/dog.gif>), the client would have to do a separate SFR
lookup, incurring additional latency. Our (currently unimplemented) solution is to allow the content
provider to insert hints next to local URLs. These hints would indicate that the reference is local
and would also contain a pathname.
Optimizations. As described earlier, o-records' location fields may contain DNS names,
possibly introducing extra latency (since clients would have to do two sets of lookups, one for SFR
and one for DNS). If reducing latency were paramount for the o-re cord owner, however, the owner
might avoid this layer of indirection and instead rely on an external system that directly updates the
IP addresses in batches of o-records.
Tools. We believe that any realistic deployment of SFR would necessarily be accompanied by
new editing tools for content providers that either hide the actual references or else make them easier
to work with. Although questions about how to build these tools are worthwhile, they are outside




SFR portal nodes run a slightly modified version of MIT's DHash/Chord [8, 31] along with a sep-
arate SFR server module that uses DHash's API to store and retrieve o-records in response to
client requests. Client applications interact with SFR by linking to the SFR client library, which
communicates with a nearby SFR portal via a simple request/response protocol, as pictured in Fig-
ure 5.1. We have not yet implemented the SFR relay. The SFR client library exposes put() and
geto methods to applications for storing and retrieving o-records. Both the SFR server and SFR
client cache o-records according to the TTL field.
The SFR server has several purposes: it abstracts the underlying DHT for applications that use
SFR; it exposes a narrow interface (so that SFR clients need not conform to the wider interfaces that
DHTs sometimes require); and it serves as a marshal for client requests, allowing SFR to control its
clients' interaction with the DHT and allowing administrators to extend the SFR server to implement
other security and access control functions.
To achieve reference integrity through randomness, we modified DHash to enforce the relation-
ship described in Section 3.3 between the reference, a salt and a public key. Like DHash, the SFR
server and SFR client are written in C++, use the SFS toolkit [17] for asynchronous programming
and cryptographic operations, and run on FreeBSD and Linux. Because of the simple network pro-
tocol between the SFR client and server, we anticipate that writing SFR clients in other languages
and on other platforms will not be difficult.
The protocol has four messages: GetRequest, GetResponse, PutRequest, and PutResponse.
The messages' contents (including items like the salt, the o-record, and the public key) are sent
using type-length-value (TLV) encoding; both the client and server sign their messages. Applica-
tions must supply the public key of the SFR portal to the SFR client library (the converse is not
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Figure 5.1: SFR implementation.
which the client supplies). The implementation currently assumes a stream-oriented connection
(which is certainly not optimal for performance), but it would not require much effort to move to an
unreliable service like UDP.
5.2 WEB-OVER-SFR IMPLEMENTATION
SFR clients are not yet embedded in Web browsers and so to prototype the Web-over-SFR, we use a
Web proxy that simulates how a Web browser would interact with SFR if SFR were ubiquitous. The
proxy is written in C++ and uses the SFS toolkit and SFR client library. The proxy's basic operation
is translating URLs submitted by clients into SFR URLs. The proxy serves several functions: (1) it
allows end-users to experience the latency associated with SFR as compared to DNS; (2) it allows
us to dynamically populate SFR with the o-records that would exist if the whole Web used SFR;
and (3) it allows us to test the usability of semantic-free URLs.
In its usual mode, the proxy addresses (1) and (2). When a client browser requests a traditional
URL, the proxy translates it into an SFR lookup by first hashing the URL and using that hash as the
salt, and then hashing this salt together with the proxy's public key, thereby creating an SFRTag (as
described in Section 3.3). The proxy then uses the SFR client to retrieve meta-data for this SFRTag.
If the lookup is successful, the proxy uses the IP, port, and pathname information in the returned
o-record to contact the actual Web server and then begins returning content to the client, thereby
incurring the latency associated with an SFR lookup. If the lookup is unsuccessful, the proxy,
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besides returning content to the client, populates the SFR infrastructure on demand by constructing
an appropriate o-record (based on a DNS lookup) and inserting it into the infrastructure.
This o-record contains a list of (IP address, port) pairs as well as a corresponding list of
paths, a timestamp, and the TTL from DNS (different from the o-record's TTL field, discussed in
Section 3.1). The proxy stores these latter two items to obey DNS's semantics: if the proxy does
an SFR lookup and the TTL has expired, the proxy executes another DNS request and inserts the
updated o-record into the infrastructure.
The SFR Web proxy also directly accepts URLs of the form http://0123aa.../optional-path
and treats the 0123aa portion as an SFRTag (as we described in Section 4). Given Web pages with
this type of SFR URL, we can test SFR's usability. In the future, we plan to have the proxy also
rewrite traditional URLs in the Web pages that it returns to clients to make these URLs semantic-




We analyze SFR's performance using a combination of real-world data and simulation.
6.1 LATENCY DATA
We deployed SFR nodes running DHash/Chord and the SFR portal software on the PlanetLab
testbed [26]. The Chord ring uses approximately 130 physical hosts and 390 virtual nodes [31]. We
also deployed our Web proxy at three different PlanetLab locations, and seven people (including
the authors) used this proxy for days at a time over a one month period. When the proxy receives
a URL, it creates two SFRTags-one corresponding to the hostname portion of the URL and the
other corresponding to the entire URL-and then submits both to the embedded SFR client (which
in turn contacts the SFR portal running on the local host). In order to permit a fair experiential
comparison with DNS, the proxy returns content to the user as soon as the SFR client returns the
o-record corresponding to the hostname digest. The SFR client cache (which obeys DNS TTLs in
our implementation) is then equivalent to a DNS cache. If SFR were actually deployed, the number
of SFRTags would be in between the number of hostnames and the number of distinct URLs on the
Web: many SFRTags will certainly refer to directories under Web sites but not to individual Web
pages.
Figure 6.1 compares the CDF of SFR's latency (as measured by the SFR portals) to a dataset
for DNS that depicts a CDF of latency, as measured by a resolver at MIT. Only the SFR lookups
that resulted in a Chord lookup are represented; the rest are satisfied via the SFR client's or the
SFR portal's o-record cache. We use lookups from an eight-day period in September 2003; the
depicted period occurred during the one month period mentioned above and after a bug fix that
slightly improved latency. Because of the limited size of the PlanetLab Chord ring, aggressive
caching of other virtual nodes' locations, and sharing of these caches among virtual nodes, 98% of
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Figure 6.1: CDFs of SFR latency and DNS dataset
hops. We show in simulation below that even in a large Chord ring, aggressive location caching
results in two or three hops per lookup.
The DNS data comes from the work by Jung et al. [161 and depicts the end-to-end latency
experienced by a resolver at MIT when NS record cache misses occurred. We do not incorporate
A-record cache misses because doing so would unfairly count the many small requests for low-TTL
A-records that are directed to CDNs, which move the name servers for popular content close to the
client in many cases. We anticipate that if SFR were widely deployed, CDNs running over it would
be able to implement similar optimizations. The DNS data is three years old and was collected at a
single institution; hence, this comparison is meant to be suggestive, only, and not conclusive.
The feedback from our users is that perceived latency was generally indistinguishable from
DNS, and Figure 6.1 supports this claim, suggesting that SFR's latency in the common case (two
hops) is reasonably close to DNS's.
6.2 SIMULATION
We have just seen that on a testbed shared by hundreds of researchers, two and even three hop
Chord lookups yield reasonable latencies. We now wish to confirm with simulations that--despite
the O(log n) theoretical bound for number of lookups-two and three hop lookups will, in fact, be
the norm when the hosts implementing the DHT do aggressive location caching.
We used a modified version of the Chord simulator described by Stoica et al. [31] to gather trace-
driven results. In the simulator, nodes add any node with which they communicate to the location
cache. Eviction proceeds LRU, though a node's fingers will never be ejected. Because of Chord's
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Figure 6.2: Simulated effect of location caching on hop count (a) without failures and (b) with node
failures. 1000 nodes.
nodes nearby in ID space.
To drive our simulations, we used two days of NLANR cache trace data [14], aggregating the
separate caches' logs. Each URL in the aggregated trace causes a simulated SFR lookup of the
URL's hash. (Hashing hostnames produced slightly better results, so we conservatively present
the former.) To "warm up" the location cache, we ran the simulator on a day's worth of NLANR
requests and then tabulated hop counts for the next 106 requests.
Figure 6.2(a) presents the results of this experiment for various location cache sizes and a 1,000
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node Chord ring. Location caching reduces the number of hops to two or three because "being
close counts": if the originating node, 0, has not cached the target of a lookup, T, 0 is nonetheless
likely to know about a node P near T, and P is likely to know about T. We believe that caching
constant fractions of the Chord ring is reasonable because the number of nodes in a deployed SFR
infrastructure would be bounded.
We must be careful, however. If the DHT's membership often changes, larger location caches
could have more stale state and thus be detrimental. We expect, though, that as long as the mem-
bership changes relatively infrequently compared to the rate of requests, then failures will not much
alter hop counts or even latencies. To see why, note that if a DHT node 0 attempts to communicate
with a failed node, F, 0 will wait for a set length of time (500 ms in the simulation) before con-
cluding that F is inaccessible. After this interval, 0 evicts F's entry from its cache and then tries
to contact a different node. This permits lookups to make progress, even if the lookup path reaches
a failed node [31]. If requests arrive frequently, then stale state will be corrected frequently and
the number of timeouts will be relatively small; on average, therefore, the chum does not increase
latency much. (This "cleaning-on-demand" is in addition to Chord's stabilization procedure, which
also helps clear old state in the location cache.)
To examine failures experimentally, we first used the NLANR trace to warm up the cache with
a million requests. (Although this warm-up period differs from the previous one, the effect is neg-
ligible in practice.) We then used interleaved Poisson processes: node deaths and births each occur
on average once every 10 seconds, and, concurrently, 10,000 document lookups occur at an average
rate of 20 per second, the approximate lookup rate in the NLANR trace. We believe that a failure
in the infrastructure every 10 seconds is a significant over-estimate. Figure 6.2(b) shows the results:
failures do not affect average hop counts and only slightly affect the 99th and 1st percentiles. Time-
outs vary slightly with the location cache size but are never more frequent than an average of .04
timeouts per lookup, with a 99th percentile of two.
We conclude this section by noting that DNS's failure resilience depends on proper manual
configuration of name servers and on zone transfers between primary and secondary servers. We do
not envision the same degree of manual involvement in SFR's operation.
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7ALTERNATIVES AND RELATED WORK
In this section, we consider alternative designs and related work, first focusing on design decisions
we made in the context of SFR and then discussing other proposals with similar goals.
7.1 SFR WITH MORE OR LESS
SFR--. We considered a more minimal design, called SFR--, that associates every SFRTag
to an authoritative domain that hosts the actual o-record. In this model, looking up an SFRTag
in the global SFR infrastructure returns only a pointer to an organization's resolver, and then this
organization-specific resolver maps the SFRTag to the object's actual meta-data. This approach
unfortunately requires each organization to host its own SFR service and each client to do an extra
lookup (if caching fails), namely the one inside the organization.
However, there are several advantages to this approach, and they are instructive. First, SFR--
is analogous to the way DNS's top-level domain servers point to NS records, so SFR-- inherits
the usual benefits of hierarchy (e.g., fate sharing), but it does so without any structure built into
the references themselves. Second, SFR--'s global records point only to individual organizations
and so would rarely change, and third, because SFR-- offloads many of the reference resolution
problems to the individual organizations, it explicitly allows each organization to implement its own
solutions to problems like object migration and replication.
SFR++. SFR can't directly handle massive replication because sending all locations to the client
is unwieldy, and SFR itself doesn't have any application-independent way of selecting which loca-
tions are best for the client. A modified design, SFR++, would allow SFR to disambiguate between
multiple locations based on selectorfields. That is, content providers could associate several logical
o-re cords to the same SFRTag; when a client does a lookup on a given SFRTag, the infrastructure
could use a client attribute, such as IP address, as a selection mechanism for choosing from a set of
o-records the one that corresponds to a location near the client.
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The ability to disambiguate based on selector fields would also allow SFR to deal more grace-
fully with object transformation, when the object referred to by a given SFRTag splits into several
component objects. Currently SFR uses redirection (see Section 4.1), which is not ideal; with
SFR-embedded disambiguation, however, clients could submit, on a lookup, the optional-path
component of an SFR URL in addition to the SFRTag. The responsible SFR node could then do
longest prefix matches to track transformed objects, according to a table set by the content provider
and stored alongside the o-record.
7.2 RRS: OTHER APPROACHES
The Globe literature [2, 32, 33] articulates the case for a single, general-purpose infrastructure for
mapping persistent object identifiers to current locations. While they do not state that references
should be inherently human-unfriendly, they do observe (1) that persistence implies that references
cannot encode information about how they are resolved and (2) that human-level names should
be strictly separated from identifiers. Globe's choice of a resolving substrate, however, differs from
ours; in particular, the Globe location service relies on distributed trees overlaid on a static hierarchy
of nodes (though, as in SFR, the identifiers themselves are not hierarchical nor is there any a priori
difference among the hosts comprising the tree). SFR's approach to reference integrity, fate sharing,
and latency differ from Globe's as well.
The URN community [2, 5, 9, 19, 28, 29] makes a case nearly identical to Globe's for persistent
identifiers that identify individual objects; they propose a framework in which each application
would have its own resolving infrastructure and its own namespace. In addition, the URN standards
specify that references are to be human-unfriendly [29], but they neither specifically advocate that
the infrastructure enforce randomness in the references nor do they propose a way to resolve these
references.
The Open Network Handles proposal [23, 24] articulates the need for a human-unfriendly
namespace with persistent identifiers, and its vision is similar to ours. However, these numeric
Handles would each exist in their own DNS domain underneath particular altruistic providers (e.g.,
h1282132.nicesponsor.org); this approach contrasts with our claim that full location indepen-
dence means not encoding any identifying information-not even about the provider responsible
for the meta-data-into the reference itself.
If Open Network Handles were enhanced so the altruistic provider were removed from the URL,
then all of these handles would exist in the same domain, and the challenge of routing in an unpar-
titioned namespace would arise, along with the other challenges we mention. This scheme would
thus be functionally equivalent to SFR. (This assumes DNS were augmented with a record type
that abstracted individual objects, otherwise these Handles could not provide location-independent,
per-object references.)
As a final alternative, the Secure File System (SFS) [18] is an example of an existing system
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that relies on human-unfriendly identifiers with cryptographic guarantees. Although SFS references
consist of a hostname, a hash of a public key, and a pathname, and are thereby tied to administra-
tive domains, one could extend SFS to provide machine independent references by, for example,
removing the hostname component and mapping the hash of the public key to a machine via a
level of indirection like our o-record. At that point, SFS would either face similar challenges to
the ones we have identified, or it would make use of SFR (though it would additionally have all
of SFS's security benefits). However, this scheme could not provide any kind of object migration
without redirects (implemented via symbolic links in SFS space), and the SFS literature has never
articulated the need for persistent, location-independent identifiers.
7.3 OTHER RELATED WORK
Frankston notes DNS's conflation of user-level names and references and also proposes a set of
semantic-free references for the Web, though he does not detail a design [10]. The PURL project
provides a layer of indirection via HTTP redirects to give location-independent, persistent URLs
that may or may not contain semantics [27]. Phelps and Wilensky suggest a scheme for robust
hyperlinks in which every document would have a unique signature, consisting of several words, and
every referring hyperlink would embed the signature so that if a link were broken, a search engine
could then find the document [25]. These schemes make use of, and are therefore constrained by,
the existing Web infrastructure.
Digital Object Identifiers (DOIs) [13] are a URN implementation with persistent object identi-
fiers in a managed but human-unfriendly namespace. DOIs are in use (including by ACM) and rely
on the Handle System [6], an RRS that maps persistent identifiers to object meta-data using two
levels of hierarchy.
The i3 infrastructure envisions a widely deployed substrate for a general form of indirection [30].
This service indirects routing whereas SFR is an application-level layer of indirection for naming.
Cox et al. describe an implementation of DNS in which they use Chord as a lookup mechanism for
DNS A-records, thereby eliminating many administrative problems that result from the hierarchy
in DNS [7]. They hash domain names into a flat namespace and use the original names both as
identifiers and as a way of creating a public key hierarchy to authenticate a given A-record. They do
not assume widespread caching of either the data being delivered (o-records in our case, RRsets
in theirs) or of the other nodes in the Chord ring. Based on pessimistic assumptions about the in-
frastructure (ones we do not share because we think our system will be a managed service in which
locations are cached), they conclude that the performance of DNS over Chord is unacceptable.
They make no arguments in favor of an application-independent, semantic-free, general purpose




The goal of SFR is not to provide equivalent functionality to DNS, which ought to continue with its
original purpose of hostname translation, but rather to provide a more attractive alternative for the
subclass of applications, like referencing Web objects, that require an RRS.
In this paper, we have knowingly adopted an extreme view, namely that references should en-
code neither human readable semantics nor any other information about the referenced object. It is
entirely possible, however, that the referencing system of the future will be somewhere in between
DNS and SFR, either because human readability turns out to be critical or because a hierarchi-
cal resolving scheme that ties references to particular providers turns out to be the right economic
model. For now, we simply observe that from a usability perspective, today's DNS and SFR each
offer something the other does not. DNS makes composing and publicizing content easy while SFR
attempts to achieve the full potential of the Web as a medium in which anyone can publish (even
without controlling a domain), in which objects can freely migrate, and for which the infrastructure
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